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Madsen and Crawford: The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, Vol. 3

There is a comfortable fit to the feeling
and tone of this autobiography. The camaraderie of the wardroom, the constant moving back and forth from sea
to shore, the hard work and great rewards of command at sea, and the
friendly naval gossip are so recognizable
that he could be talking about the Navy
of today. Indeed, the real charm of this
book is in its candid yet loving portrait
of one of the truly abiding institutions of
the U.S. Navy. Captain Edward L. Beach,
Sr., with the nicest of assists from his accomplished officer-author son, has given
us not only his own story but a warm insider’s view of our beloved Navy as well.
This is a volume that deserves a spot in
any serious Navy library.
JAMES STAVRIDIS

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group 12

Crawford, Michael J., et al., ed. The Naval War of
1812: A Documentary History. Vol. 3. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center (GPO), 2002.
874pp. $70

During the War of 1812, the United
States attempted to invade Canada
three times in separate campaigns and
failed on each occasion. Inept leadership, militia and service differences, and
lost tactical opportunities marred translation of strategic aims into a workable
operational plan. Vastly outnumbered
by American troops on the land frontier
along the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River, the British and Canadians
remained on the defensive until events
in Europe released regular reinforcements and ships of the Royal Navy. In
1814, Great Britain applied seapower
against the United States and took
the offensive. The resulting stalemate
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eventually brought the two adversaries
to the peace table to sign the Treaty of
Ghent, whereby British North America’s territorial integrity was preserved
for the later confederation of Canada
into a nation. This documentary collection, the third volume of a projected series of four to be published by
the Naval Historical Center on the naval side of the war, concentrates on the
Chesapeake Bay, Great Lakes, and
Pacific theaters from 1814 to 1815.
The selection of documents, like the
two preceding volumes, deals comprehensively with events and persons
behind the main battles and campaigns on both sides, as well as with
such matters as recruitment, logistics,
shipbuilding, and social relations
from a wider perspective.
Almost half the book is devoted to the
British blockade of the Chesapeake Bay
and American defense against the
mounting amphibious incursions of
General Robert Ross and Admiral
Alexander Cochrane into the American
heartland. Once the resolve of General
William Winder and his sundry troops
crumbled at the battle of Bladensburg,
Washington was left wide open. The
occupying British burned the White
House and other public buildings (allegedly in retaliation for burning the
provincial legislature at York [presentday Toronto] by American sailors in
April the previous year). The documents highlight the flexibility accorded
the British to choose when and where
to attack from the sea, as well as the significant naval contribution in stiffening
American defenses.
The British likewise demonstrated the
possibilities of concerted military and
naval action on the internal waters of
Lake Huron, Lake Ontario, and Lake
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Champlain, the high point being Commodore Sir James Yeo’s amphibious raid
on the American transfer point at Oswego, and the low point definitely being
General George Prevost’s retreat from
Plattsburg. On the opposing side, Commodore Isaac Chauncey’s support of
American armies on the Niagara frontier
took second place to a growing shipbuilding race between the American and
British naval commanders. The American land campaign was irretrievably impaired, the hoped-for decisive battle to
determine naval ascendancy on Lake
Ontario never materialized before peace
came, and the republic’s finances were
left in tatters. The documents are carefully chosen to show the consequences
of confused operational-level decision
making and of the failure to pursue
joint operations in an effective manner.
If Chauncey inclined toward caution
on the Great Lakes, Captain David
Porter’s decision to abandon a successful commerce-destruction cruise in favor of seeking out superior British
naval forces in decisive combat off the
Chilean coast was rash and impulsive.
American hopes for challenging the
British in the Pacific ended with the
frigate Essex’s submission to British
firepower. In spite of the defeat, Porter
returned home to a hero’s welcome,
while the officers and sailors whom he
left behind faced numerous hardships
and another year in British captivity.
Inclusion of this small episode in the
collection presents a reminder that personal considerations of fame and glory
are no replacement for sound strategy.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss4/27

BOOK REVIEWS

183

Porter spent the rest of his life trying to
justify his actions.
The collection makes accessible many
primary documents used in classical
works by Alfred T. Mahan and Theodore
Roosevelt, as well as recent monographs
by Anthony Pitch, Robert Malcomson,
and Barry Gough. For anyone who has
struggled to decipher handwriting in
the originals, availability of typed and
organized documents is a major benefit.
Introductory essays to the chapters and
subchapters are informative and balanced, while extensive footnotes give
more details on people and sources.
The index, perhaps the book’s most
valuable feature, allows readers to identify specific matters of interest within
the documents quickly and efficiently.
The end of each chapter shows the location and source from which individual
documents were drawn, with microfilm
numbers provided for Washington-area
repositories, but no corresponding microfilm numbers appear for Record
Group 8 in Ottawa. This discrepancy,
though minor, detracts from the book’s
usefulness in tracking down originals
for the sake of comparison, accuracy,
and provenance.
This documentary collection, of which
the first volume was published in 1978,
will become a standard reference source
in most libraries and undoubtedly stimulate awareness and scholarship about
this forgotten war on both sides of the
international border.
CHRIS MADSEN

Canadian Forces College
Toronto, Canada
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